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Abstract 
An item offered in the buy-it-now offer (BINO) format is sold to the first consumer who 
is willing to pay the asked price. The “lifetime” of a BINO, therefore, depends on how 
many consumers are interested in the item and on how much they value it. In this 
paper, we model this dependency by combining survival analysis and auction theory. 
Our model enables sellers to quantify consumer interest and consumer valuation for 
their items from observing BINO lifetimes only. Further, the influence of covariates 
(e.g., the item condition) can be investigated. To demonstrate this, we apply our model 
to a dataset that we have collected from eBay. The dataset consists of 1,821 BINOs of a 
single product, the iPhone 5S. For this example, we find a new item to attract, on 
average, 1.26 consumers per day, who have a mean valuation of 384.97 EUR. 
Keywords: Consumer interest, Consumer valuation, Buy-it-now offers, Survival analysis 
Introduction 
During the last two decades, online auctions have become a popular way to sell items over the internet. 
Sellers often have great freedom when choosing the auction parameters. These include monetary 
parameters (e.g., the reserve price), design parameters (e.g., the item description), and transaction 
parameters (e.g., shipping and payment). Obviously, sellers would benefit from knowing how consumers 
react to a change of these parameters, or, more concretely, how each parameter influences their interest in 
the item and their valuation for it. However, consumer interest and consumer valuation are latent 
constructs that cannot be observed. To draw inference on them, one has to relate them to an outcome 
variable, which for the case of an auction usually is its ending price. This relation is established by 
consumer behavior, which here means bidding behavior. Unfortunately, bidding behavior is complex 
because it involves several strategic decisions of each consumer (e.g., when to submit a bid), which 
depend on the (observed or expected) decisions of her/his competitors at that. A large number of likewise 
complex models have been developed to describe its numerous aspects. However, such models can only 
address a few of the latter, and this often only based on strong assumptions (e.g., on consumers’ risk 
attitudes). Besides, even if they were appropriate, the results may still be biased due to various distortions 
that auctions are prone to (e.g., sellers bidding on their own items in order to increase ending prices). 
On many online auctions platforms such as eBay, auctions are not the only available selling format. An 
important alternative that we consider in this paper are buy-it-now offers (BINOs). In this format, no 
auction takes place; instead, the item is offered for a certain time to all consumers at a fixed price set by 
the seller in the beginning. If a consumer declares to be willing to pay this price, s/he receives the item 
and the BINO ends successfully. The BINO also ends, but unsuccessfully, if this does not happen until it 
reaches its maximum duration. In this case, the item remains unsold with the seller. Obviously, consumer 
behavior in BINOs is much simpler than in auctions because it involves only a single decision of each 
consumer, which s/he can make without considering her/his competitors at that: whether to buy the item 
at the asked price or not. This may be one reason why BINOs have drawn much less research attention 
than auctions, despite they on many platforms make up the largest part of all listings (on eBay, for 
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example, roughly 73% (Hasker and Sickles 2010)), which demonstrates their practical relevance. Another 
reason may be that it is not clear what can be learned from observing BINOs. While the ending prices of 
auctions have a direct practical meaning, the only outcome of a BINO seems to be whether the item has 
been sold or not, which is not too informative. However, there is a second, hidden variable that can be 
regarded as the outcome of a BINO: its “lifetime”. The variation in this variable is obviously much greater 
than in the aforementioned one, but is seems to lack any practical relevance: Why should sellers care 
about how long it takes until their items are sold (if they are)? Some will argue that this indeed is 
important since sellers may exhibit time preference. The actually interesting point, however, is that BINO 
lifetimes carry information on consumer interest and consumer valuation. This is because the item is sold 
to the first consumer who is willing to pay the asked price. If it is possible to extract this information, the 
problems that arise when quantifying these factors on the basis of auctions can be bypassed. 
In this work, we develop a model to do so. Our model is based on survival analysis, a set of methods that 
have been developed in lifetime statistics to analyze duration data (to which BINO lifetimes belong). In 
information systems research, these methods are still rather uncommon, although more closely related 
disciplines such as engineering make use of them under various labels. Instead of specifying the 
probability distribution of BINO lifetimes directly (as it is common in survival analysis), we derive it from 
standard assumptions of auction theory, observing that the set of consumers on a platform is the same for 
all selling formats. This way, a natural parameterization is achieved that allows to separate consumer 
interest and consumer valuation by the variation in the thresholds for the latter, the asked prices. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In the next section, we give an overview over 
previous research related to our work. Afterwards, we present our model and apply it to a dataset 
collected from eBay. We conclude with discussing its current limitations and how we intend to overcome 
them as we progress. Furthermore, some directions for future research are given. 
Related Previous Research 
As mentioned earlier, research on BINOs is sparse compared to research on auctions. However, the 
related format of buy-it-now auctions (BINAs) has been investigated extensively. In BINAs, sellers offer 
consumers a buy-it-now option like in BINOs, but, in contrast to these, not as the only way to buy the item 
but in addition to a concurrent auction. Sellers were shown to have an incentive to do so if they or 
consumers are impatient (Gallien and Gupta 2007; Mathews 2004) or risk averse (Chen et al. 2013; 
Mathews and Katzman 2006; Reynolds and Wooders 2009), if consumers form a reference price for the 
item based on the asked price (Shunda 2009, but see Hernando-Veciana 2012), or if sellers offer multiple 
identical items simultaneously (Anwar and Zheng 2015). In these situations, the presence of a buy-it-now 
option affects optimal consumer behavior in such a way that sellers’ revenues increase. Empirical results 
(Popkowski-Leszczyc et al. 2009; Shahriar and Wooders 2011) are consistent with the theoretical 
predictions, although it has also been observed that consumers often do not exercise a buy-it-now option 
even if the asked price is below the prevailing market price of the item (Standifird et al. 2005). 
A closely related stream of research has investigated how BINOs compare with auctions and BINAs. A 
classical result is that auctions dominate any other selling format in terms of maximizing sellers’ revenues 
under certain conditions (Myerson 1981). However, this may change if these conditions are not met. E.g., 
if consumers exhibit bounded rationality, no format dominates (Jiang et al. 2013). If the auction is costly 
for the consumers and/or the seller, the latter may be better off when opting for the BINO format (Sun et 
al. 2010). Recently, it was even found that sellers would prefer offering their items at a platform where 
only BINOs are available (Bauner 2015). This is supported by empirical evidence that BINOs achieve 
higher prices than auctions (Hammond 2010). Using both formats in parallel may still be a better strategy 
for sellers (Caldentey and Vulcano 2007; Etzion and Moore 2013). 
This paper is also related to all studies that investigate consumer interest and/or consumer valuation on 
an online auction platform. An important result here is that the information contained in bid histories is 
not sufficient to identify these factors non-parametrically (Athey and Haile 2002). Identification is 
possible, however, if they are assumed to have no common determinants (Adams 2007) or when 
consumer interest is endogenized (Nekipelov 2007). The latter can also be canceled out, so that consumer 
valuation is identified solely (Song 2004). We remark that we are not aware of any study that aims to 
exploit the information contained in BINO lifetimes for identification purposes. 
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The situation is similar apart from identification results. Like our work, most empirical studies related to 
consumer interest and/or consumer valuation rely on parametric models, given that the influence of 
covariates is difficult to measure and interpret otherwise. When auctions and their ending prices are 
considered, the aforementioned problems can arise. An illustrative example is (Lucking-Reiley et al. 
2007), who use ending prices without accounting for consumer interest (which, e.g., Bajari and Hortaçsu 
2003 do). Therefore, they effectively explain the highest of all consumers’ valuations instead of the 
average. As mentioned earlier, another approach is to regard whether the item has been sold or not as the 
dependent variable (Highfill and O’Brien 2009). This approach is actually a trimmed version of ours: In 
addition to whether the item has been sold, we exploit the (obviously more rich) information of how long 
it has taken to get to this point. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study using BINO lifetimes 
as the dependent variable to draw inference on consumer interest and consumer valuation. 
Modeling the Lifetime of a BINO 
Structural Model 
Let 𝑇𝑗
∗ denote a random variable describing the lifetime of a BINO 𝑗. In survival analysis, the probability 
distribution of 𝑇𝑗
∗ is usually characterized by the survival function 𝑆𝑗(𝑡). For each point in time 𝑡, 𝑆𝑗(𝑡) 
represents the probability that the event of interest (here the item of 𝑗 being sold) does not occur before or 
in 𝑡. We derive this probability by a general consideration: The item of 𝑗 is sold only if there exists at least 
one consumer 𝑖 who is interested in it and has a valuation 𝑉𝑗,𝑖  for it that exceeds the asked price 𝑝𝑗. Put the 
other way round, it remains unsold until the end of 𝑡 if all 𝑁𝑗,𝑡  consumers who have become aware of (have 
arrived at) 𝑗 by then have valuations not exceeding 𝑝𝑗. Thus, 𝑆𝑗(𝑡) can be formalized rather generally as 
𝑆𝑗(𝑡) ≔ P(𝑇𝑗
∗ > 𝑡) =∑P(𝑁𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑛) ⋅ P(𝑉𝑗,𝑖 ≤ 𝑝𝑗∀𝑖 ∈ {1;… ;𝑁𝑗,𝑡}|𝑁𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑛)
∞
𝑛=0
. (1) 
The first part of the right-hand side of (1) is the probability that exactly 𝑛 consumers will arrive until the 
end of 𝑡, while summing over all feasible 𝑛. In line with literature on auction theory (e.g., Bajari and 
Hortaçsu 2003), we model the arrival process as a Poisson process with rate 𝜆𝑗; that is, 
P(𝑁𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑛) =
(𝜆𝑗 ⋅ 𝑡)
𝑛
𝑛!
⋅ 𝑒−𝜆𝑗⋅𝑡 . (2) 
Note that because there usually are a large number of consumers on an online auction platform, who are 
interested in any particular item with only a low probability and independently of each other, this 
assumption is justified by the Poisson limit theorem (see, e.g., Karr 1993, p. 155). 
The second part is the conditional probability that, given that exactly 𝑛 consumers have arrived, none of 
them values the item so much to buy it at the price 𝑝𝑗. We assume that each consumer 𝑖 draws her/his 
valuation 𝑉𝑗,𝑖 , which is her/his private knowledge, from a probability distribution 𝒱𝑗, which is common 
knowledge, independently from her/his competitors. This is referred to as the independent private value 
paradigm (Vickrey 1961). With 𝑉𝑗 denoting the distribution function of 𝒱𝑗, this can be formalized as 
P(𝑉𝑗,𝑖 ≤ 𝑝𝑗∀𝑖 ∈ {1;… ;𝑁𝑗,𝑡}|𝑁𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑛) =∏𝑉𝑗(𝑝𝑗)
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 𝑉𝑗(𝑝𝑗)
𝑛
. (3) 
Plugging in (2) and (3) into (1), we get 
𝑆𝑗(𝑡) =∑
(𝜆𝑗 ⋅ 𝑡)
𝑛
𝑛!
⋅ 𝑒−𝜆𝑗⋅𝑡 ⋅ 𝑉𝑗(𝑝𝑗)
𝑛
∞
𝑛=0
 
=
𝑒−𝜆𝑗⋅𝑡
𝑒−𝜆𝑗⋅𝑡⋅𝑉𝑗(𝑝𝑗)
⋅∑
(𝜆𝑗 ⋅ 𝑡 ⋅ 𝑉𝑗(𝑝𝑗))
𝑛
𝑛!
⋅ 𝑒−𝜆𝑗⋅𝑡⋅𝑉𝑗(𝑝𝑗)
∞
𝑛=0⏟                    
=1
 
= exp(−𝜆𝑗 ⋅ (1 − 𝑉𝑗(𝑝𝑗)) ⋅ 𝑡) 
(4) 
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as the functional form of 𝑆𝑗(𝑡).1 This means, 𝑇𝑗
∗ is exponentially distributed with rate 𝜆𝑗 ⋅ (1 −𝑉𝑗(𝑝𝑗)). 
So far, we have implicitly assumed that the realization 𝑡𝑗
∗ of 𝑇𝑗
∗ is observable for all BINOs 𝑗. However, as 
mentioned earlier, BINOs have a certain maximum duration 𝑑𝑗. If the item is sold within this duration 
(that is, for successful BINOs), 𝑡𝑗
∗ indeed is observable. Otherwise, one only knows that 𝑡𝑗
∗ must be greater 
than 𝑑𝑗. Put differently, only 𝑡𝑗 = min(𝑡𝑗
∗; 𝑑𝑗) can be observed for all BINOs. This corresponds to right 
censoring. Ignoring unsuccessful BINOs would, therefore, bias the results in favor of BINOs with small 
values of 𝑡𝑗
∗. Instead, they have to be accounted for by altering the log-likelihood function 𝐿𝐿 of the model: 
While the contribution of uncensored observations (indicated by setting a dummy variable 𝑐𝑗  to 0) is the 
probability density of the event 𝑇𝑗
∗ = 𝑡𝑗, given by −𝑆𝑗
′(𝑡𝑗), censored observations (indicated by setting 𝑐𝑗  
to 1) only contribute the probability of 𝑇𝑗
∗ > 𝑡𝑗, given by 𝑆𝑗(𝑡𝑗). Thus, we have 
𝐿𝐿(𝜽) = log(∏(−𝑆𝑗
′(𝑡𝑗))
1−𝑐𝑗
⋅ 𝑆𝑗(𝑡𝑗)
𝑐𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
) 
=∑[(1− 𝑐𝑗) ⋅ log(𝜆𝑗 ⋅ (1 − 𝑉𝑗(𝑝𝑗)) ⋅ 𝑆𝑗(𝑡𝑗)) + 𝑐𝑗 ⋅ log⁡𝑆𝑗(𝑡𝑗)]
𝐽
𝑗=1
 
=∑[(1− 𝑐𝑗) ⋅ log(𝜆𝑗 ⋅ (1 − 𝑉𝑗(𝑝𝑗))) − 𝜆𝑗 ⋅ (1 − 𝑉𝑗(𝑝𝑗)) ⋅ 𝑡𝑗]
𝐽
𝑗=1
. 
(5) 
Note that 𝜆𝑗  and 𝑉𝑗(𝑝𝑗)  appear in 𝐿𝐿  only in the form of their product. This means that they are 
interchangeable and, thus, cannot be identified. However, the variation in the asked prices 𝑝𝑗 can be used 
to enable identification. For this purpose, a structural assumption on the valuation distribution 𝒱𝑗  has to 
be made. Following previous research (e.g., Bajari and Hortaçsu 2003), we assume it to be normal; that is, 
𝑉𝑗(𝑥) = Φ (
𝑥 − 𝜇𝑗
𝜎
), (6) 
with Φ(𝑥) =
1
√2⋅𝜋
⋅ ∫ 𝑒
−
1
2
⋅𝑧2 ⋅ d𝑧
𝑥
−∞
 being the distribution function of a standard normal distribution. The 
shape of the normal distribution is justified when most consumers have similar valuations for an item and 
only a few have a significantly lower or higher one, which for many items is a reasonable assumption. 
In the specified structural model, 𝜆𝑗  describes consumer interest, while the expectation 𝜇𝑗  and the 
standard deviation 𝜎 of 𝒱𝑗  describe the mean of and the variation in consumer valuation, respectively. 
Measurement Model 
While we regard 𝜎 as constant, we allow 𝜆𝑗  and 𝜇𝑗  to vary across BINOs. However, 𝜆𝑗  and 𝜇𝑗  are still 
essentially interchangeable within a BINO 𝑗; therefore, this variation has to be modeled for identification. 
Consumer interest is likely to vary between items of different condition (new vs. used vs. defect): Used 
items may have blemishes (e.g., scratches) that make them unattractive for some consumers. Defect items 
do no longer provide all the functions of new ones. Therefore, they are only of interest to consumers who 
do not need these functions or can repair them. For similar reasons, consumers may prefer to buy from 
business sellers than from private sellers because the former usually (have to) give a guarantee for the 
item. These considerations lead us to the following model for 𝜆𝑗: 
log𝜆𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ Used𝑗 + 𝛽2 ⋅ Defect𝑗 + 𝛽3 ⋅ BusinessSeller𝑗 . (7) 
We have used an exponential model to account for arrival rates always being positive. 
                                                          
1 The underbraced term in the second line of (4) is equal to 1 because it can be interpreted as the sum of 
the probabilities of all possible results 𝑛 of a Poisson distribution with rate parameter 𝜆𝑗 ⋅ 𝑡 ⋅ 𝑉𝑗(𝑝𝑗). 
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The item condition is also likely to influence consumer valuation: Instead of being not interested in used 
or defect items at all, some consumers may be willing to buy them at a reduced price. This illustrates the 
need to separate the effects of covariates on consumer interest and consumer valuation. 
Consumers in BINOs face information asymmetry (e.g., Ba et al. 2003). This is because it is difficult for 
them to judge the trustworthiness of the seller on one hand (seller risk) and the quality or exact condition 
of the item on the other hand (item risk). To compensate for this, they may adjust their valuation for the 
item (e.g., Zhou et al. 2009). Therefore, all variables relating to information asymmetry may have an 
effect on consumer valuation. The seller type is such a variable: Business sellers can be assumed to appear 
more trustworthy than private sellers, reducing seller risk; furthermore, the guarantee they usually give 
reduces item risk. Consumers can further decrease seller risk by evaluating seller ratings on the platform. 
Since negative ratings have a much stronger effect than positive ones (Standifird 2001), we consider 
whether a seller has a poor rating (defined as less than 97% of her/his individual ratings being positive). 
Item risk can further be decreased by reading the item description. Since its length (after removing HTML 
tags) tendentially reflects its detailedness, it may have explanatory value. 
Shipping costs effectively increase the (total) price of an item; however, previous research has found 
consumers to have a biased perception of partitioned prices (e.g., Morwitz et al. 1998), so that it seems 
more appropriate to model shipping costs as a further determinant of consumer valuation. Shipping may 
also influence the latter through the mean delivery time. This is because consumers usually exhibit a 
positive time preference regarding when they receive the item (e.g., Malkoc and Zauberman 2006). For 
the same reason, the possibility to pay instantly (e.g., using PayPal) should be taken into account. This is 
because sellers on many platforms often do not ship their items until they have received the payment. 
Based on these considerations, we use the following model for 𝜇𝑗: 
𝜇𝑗 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 ⋅ Used𝑗 + 𝛾2 ⋅ Defect𝑗 + 𝛾3 ⋅ BusinessSeller𝑗 + 𝛾4 ⋅ PoorRating𝑗 + 𝛾5 ⋅ DescriptionLength𝑗 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡+𝛾6 ⋅ ShippingCosts𝑗 + 𝛾7 ⋅ MeanDeliveryTime𝑗 + 𝛾8 ⋅ InstantPayment𝑗 . 
(8) 
Used𝑗 , Defect𝑗 , BusinessSeller𝑗 , PoorRating𝑗 , and InstantPayment𝑗  are dummy variables; therefore, all 
results are to be interpreted in comparison to a new item sold by a private seller with a good rating, 
without the possibility to pay instantly. All other variables are mean-centered, so that the intercepts 𝛽0 
and 𝛾0  reflect the averages of log 𝜆𝑗 and 𝜇𝑗  across all BINOs, respectively. 
Summarizing, the argument vector 𝜽  of 𝐿𝐿  consists of 14 parameters that are to be estimated: the 
intercepts 𝛽0 and 𝛾0, the coefficients 𝛽1-𝛽3 and 𝛾1-𝛾8, and the standard deviation 𝜎 of 𝒱𝑗. For the latter, the 
positivity constraint 𝜎 > 0 has to be imposed. Estimation can be done by maximum likelihood, that is, by 
maximizing 𝐿𝐿. We omit a proof of our model being identified (that is, of 𝐿𝐿 having a unique global 
maximum) due to space requirements. However, as mentioned earlier, identification comes from the 
variation in the prices 𝑝𝑗. This can be easily seen by the fact that 𝑉𝑗(𝑝𝑗) depends on 𝑝𝑗, while 𝜆𝑗 does not. 
Besides, we have tested our model using simulated data. In these simulations, the true parameters were 
always accurately recovered, so that identification does not seem to be a problem. 
A First Application 
Data Collection and Dataset 
We now apply our model to a dataset collected from ebay.de. We focus on eBay because it is the leading 
online auction platform worldwide. Besides, it is possible on eBay to search for BINOs that have ended 
during the last 90 days (plus some variation), regardless of whether the item has been sold or not. The 
data were retrieved in April 2015. Thus, all BINOs considered ended in January 2015 or later. 
In this research-in-progress, we restrict ourselves to a single product in order to ensure comparability 
between BINOs. We have selected the iPhone 5S for this purpose. There were three reasons for this 
choice: First, it is a product that is offered on eBay very often, so that the sample size is large. Second, it is 
regularly offered by both private and business sellers in different conditions, so that the influence of these 
variables can be investigated without worrying about small sample sizes for some of their combinations. 
Third, it is a very homogeneous product (in contrast to, e.g., paintings), so that there are few varying 
product characteristics (which we do not investigate). These were further homogenized by restricting our 
sample to devices with a storage capacity of 16 gigabyte and without a SIM lock. 
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The data were collected by a self-written crawler. Matching BINOs were identified based on their category 
and the values of describing attributes (e.g., “brand” and “model”) that sellers are asked to specify when 
creating the BINO. While this approach may preclude a few BINOs for which the sellers did not specify 
these attributes, it avoids ambiguities that arise when selecting BINOs by their title. For example, the term 
“iPhone 5s” may also be contained in the titles of BINOs of iPhone 5S accessories. 
On eBay, sellers have the possibility to extend the classical BINO format in two ways: First, by offering 
identical or similar items multiple times within a single BINO, and second, by allowing consumers to 
propose a price different from 𝑝𝑗 at which they would like to buy the item (“best offer”). Both options alter 
the basis on which our model has been built, so that we exclude these BINOs from our dataset. 
Almost all of the variables we investigate can be retrieved from eBay directly. An exception to this is the 
item condition. While sellers are required to report it as one of the describing attributes mentioned 
earlier, we noticed that they have strongly differing perceptions what, e.g., makes the difference between a 
used and a defect item (often, they even do not comply with eBay’s guidelines on this point). Therefore, 
we have checked the BINOs manually and, if necessary, harmonized the item condition based on the item 
description. For example, some sellers have declared devices that work properly but have a broken display 
as “used”; since consumers are likely to rather make a difference between having any defect or not than 
between having technical or optical defects, we have changed this to “defect”. 
After this preprocessing, 1,821 BINOs remain in our dataset. They are summarized in Tables 1a-1c. 
 Item Condition   Value 
New Used Defect Total  1 (Yes) 0 (No) 
S
e
ll
e
r
 
T
y
p
e
 Private 159 344 24 527 
 
V
a
r
ia
b
le
 Sold (1-𝑐𝑗) 1,234 587 
Business 501 763 30 1,294  PoorRating 35 1,786 
Total 660 1,107 54 1,821  InstantPayment 1,562 259 
 Table 1a. Number of BINOs by 
Seller Type and Item Condition 
  Table 1b. Number of BINOs by 
Further Dummy Variables 
 
Variable Unit Item Subset Min Mean Max Std. Dev. 
Price (𝑝𝑗) EUR 
New Items 300.00 458.2357 779.95 50.8188 
Used Items 100.00 358.6081 530.90 33.0964 
Defect Items 59.95 242.8506 339.80 63.8031 
Duration (𝑡𝑗) Days 
Sold Items 0.0023 4.7153 69.0704 8.8720 
Unsold Items 0.0003 6.9837 93.0418 8.1904 
DescriptionLength Characters All Items 10 1,403.2060 19,575 3,052.4110 
ShippingCosts EUR All Items 0.00 1.6774 16.00 2.5693 
MeanDeliveryTime Days All Items 2  2.6546 12 0.8891 
Table 1c. Summary Statistics of Cardinal Variables 
Estimation and Results 
For maximizing 𝐿𝐿, we employed the BFGS-algorithm (Broydon 1970; Fletcher 1970; Goldfarb 1970; 
Shanno 1970). To avoid it converging to a local maximum, we repeated the estimation procedure 100 
times with different, randomly chosen starting values and regarded the replication that has led to the 
largest value of 𝐿𝐿 as the final result (Finch et al. 1989). This value was −3,688.8840, compared to a value 
of −3,878.3440  for the null model (with 𝛽0 , 𝛾0 , and 𝜎  as parameters only). Using the formula of 
(Nagelkerke 1991), this corresponds to a pseudo-R² measure of 19.0553%. Note that unlike the usual R², 
values above 20% would already be considered as indicating an “excellent fit” (McFadden 1979, p. 307). 
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The resulting coefficients of the determinants of consumer interest and consumer valuation are reported 
in Table 2 (in reverse order for better readability). Their discussion is postponed to the next section. 
 Consumer Valuation Consumer Interest 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. p  Coef. Std. Err. p  
(Intercept) +384.9727 1.5946 <0.0001 *** +0.2285 0.0422 <0.0001 *** 
Used -60.7161 0.1011 <0.0001 *** -0.5403 0.0589 <0.0001 *** 
Defect -85.7710 0.4454 <0.0001 *** -0.6639 0.1358 <0.0001 *** 
BusinessSeller +134.6030 1.4830 <0.0001 *** -2.0576 0.0440 <0.0001 *** 
PoorRating -5.4539 0.2307 <0.0001 ***  
DescriptionLength -0.0015 0.0014 0.2870  
ShippingCosts -4.5329 0.2675 <0.0001 *** 
MeanDeliveryTime -3.9358 1.4854 0.0081 *** 
InstantPayment +21.0123 1.4883 <0.0001 *** 
(Std. Dev.) 66.2138 0.2442 <0.0001 *** 
 Significance: *: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01 
Table 2. Determinants of Consumer Valuation and Consumer Interest 
Discussion and Implications 
Looking first at the determinants of 𝜇𝑗, one learns that a new iPhone 5S sold by a private seller is valued at 
384.97 EUR on average. Used and defect items are valued at 324.26 EUR (384.9727− 60.7161) and 
299.20 EUR, respectively. While it is as expected that consumer valuation decreases with a worsening 
item condition, it may come as a surprise that the difference between the latter two conditions is relatively 
small – just 8%. The reason may be that most defect items are not completely faulty. Often, just one 
particular function (e.g., the camera) is broken, while all other functions work properly. It is further 
noteworthy that the valuations for new and used items are lower than the corresponding average prices 
(see Table 1c), whereas defect items seem to be offered too cheap. 
Consumer valuation increases by 134.60 EUR when considering offers by business sellers. For the case of 
new items, this means that roughly a quarter of the total consumer valuation of 519.58 EUR (384.9727 +
134.6030) comes from the benefits associated with buying from business sellers (such as having a 
guarantee). This can motivate private sellers to also offer these benefits for an additional fee. 
Shipping costs were found to have a negative effect on consumer valuation, as expected. However, it is 
surprising that the corresponding coefficient is significantly lower than −1 (𝑝 < 0.0001); this means that 
consumers overcompensate for shipping costs: if the latter increase by 1 EUR, consumer valuation 
decreases by 4.53 EUR. This result is consistent with the aforementioned finding that consumers have a 
biased perception of partitioned prices (e.g., Morwitz et al. 1998). On this basis, one would advise sellers 
to offer free shipping and to compensate for this by asking for a higher price. In fact, this seems to be what 
actually happens, as sellers with no shipping costs charge, on average, 4.65 EUR more for their items than 
sellers with shipping costs of 1 EUR (Fritschmann et al. 2012). 
Regarding the length of the item description, no significant influence on 𝜇𝑗  was found. This is probably 
because an iPhone 5S is a well-known and, as explained earlier, very homogeneous product, so that no 
detailed description of its functions is necessary – consumers can just google them. Therefore, sellers 
should not spend too much time working out an in-depth item description for these kinds of products. 
The remaining determinants of 𝜇𝑗  are mainly of interest because of their magnitude (when compared to 
the reference case). While our results confirm that consumers value an iPhone 5S less if it is sold by a 
seller with a poor rating, the difference is very small: just 5.45 EUR. The same applies to the mean 
delivery time: additional days to delivery are indeed penalized by consumers – but just by 3.94 EUR each. 
Contrarily, the possibility to pay fast is rewarded by an increase of 21.01 EUR in 𝜇𝑗. This may indicate that 
consumers overestimate the time until the seller receives their money when not paying via an instant 
payment service (but, e.g., via a traditional bank transfer) compared to the delivery time. 
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Switching now to the determinants of 𝜆𝑗, we first note that, on average, only 1.26 (e0.2285) consumers arrive 
at a BINO of a new iPhone 5S per day. This reflects that this product is sold on eBay very often, as 
mentioned earlier, so that consumer interest in any particular item is not very large. For used and defect 
items, the rates are even lower: 0.73 (e0.2285-0.5403) and 0.65, respectively. This suggests that almost half of 
all arriving consumers look for new items, while about a quarter each look for used and defect ones. 
Interestingly, the arrival rates decrease strongly when considering offers by business sellers – for new 
items by 87% to 0.16 consumers per day (e0.2285-2.0576). This may be puzzling at first glance, especially 
against the background that we have found consumers to value items offered by a business seller much 
higher than those offered by a private seller. However, this also hints at a possible explanation: 
Consumers may intend to make a snatch on eBay. Therefore, they look foremost for items that they expect 
to be cheap, assuming that sellers set low prices rather for items valued low by consumers. 
Conclusion, Limitations, and Further Research 
In this paper, we have presented an approach to quantify consumer interest and consumer valuation 
based on the observed lifetimes of BINOs. Being still in progress, this research currently has some 
restrictions, which we intend to overcome as we advance: 
First, we have investigated only a single product. This has an immediate practical benefit: Sellers can 
proceed analogously and apply our model to any product that they offer in order to learn about consumer 
interest and consumer valuation for their items. As mentioned earlier, this knowledge can be useful when 
deciding on price setting, BINO design (e.g., regarding the item description), and transaction parameters 
(e.g., shipping). However, scientific interest is usually not focused on particular products but aims for 
more general findings. Therefore, our next step will be to extend our model in such a way that it can be 
used to analyze different products from potentially different categories. This is not a trivial matter, 
though, since it is not clear how dissimilar products can be made comparable. A step towards a solution 
may be the introduction of product- or product category-specific fixed effects in (7) and (8). 
Second, we have regarded the price of a BINO as an exogenous variable. However, with it being set by the 
seller, it is potentially endogenous. Sellers may decide on it with respect to (possibly unconsidered) 
variables that also influence consumer valuation. After this endogeneity is accounted for, one can also aim 
to investigate whether the distribution of asked prices matches the consumer valuation distribution for an 
item, that is, whether (or when) items are sold too cheap or too expensive. Thinking this to the end, the 
optimal price setting of sellers may be studied and compared to the observed price setting, as previous 
research has done based on different available information (e.g., Adams 2007). 
Third, while our abstract model (1) is relatively broad, its concretizations are somewhat narrow due to the 
specification of the consumer arrival process in (2) and the consumer valuation distribution in (6). E.g., 
previous research suggests that consumer arrival processes may be inhomogeneous (Shmueli et al. 2007). 
That is, the consumer arrival rate 𝜆𝑗, which we here have regarded as being constant over time, may in fact 
vary with time. Accounting for this, one can also investigate the presence of potential time-specific effects 
(such as, for example, less consumers searching for items during the night). Regarding consumer 
valuation, distributions other than the normal distribution can be used and compared with each other. 
Besides, it would be interesting to see whether the information contained in BINO lifetimes can 
complement other information from, e.g., bid histories, in such a way that the non-parametrical 
identification of consumer interest and consumer valuation becomes possible. 
With our work, we hope to raise interest not only in auctions and BINOs but also in the methods of 
survival analysis, which can be useful in many unexpected ways, as demonstrated in this paper. Their 
usage is advisable whenever duration data are available and censoring events can occur. This is common 
in the domain of electronic business. For example, most websites log the behavior of their users. Based on 
these log files, website owners can analyze (the determinants of) the time it takes users to perform a 
certain action (e.g., to buy a product) in order to, e.g., simplify navigation. Observations for users who 
leave the website without doing so are censored. Another possibility is to generate duration data 
somewhat artificially by defining an event of interest and observing the time until it occurs. Such an event 
can be, for example, the costs of an advertising campaign exceeding a certain limit. Censoring here takes 
place when the defined event has not occurred up to the time of analysis or cannot occur anymore (e.g., 
because the advertising campaign has been stopped before becoming too expensive). 
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